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Abstract
This paper studies how human capital a¤ects agents tendency to participate
in revolutions and consequently political outcomes. We show that since human
capital is not expropriatable in the way land or other assets are, revolutions are more
attractive if human capital is an important source of income. Specically, we present
a model of involuntary franchise extensions in which we establish a formal link
between the increasing importance of human capital as a source of income for mainly
the middle classes in 19th century Europe and franchise extensions. Intuitively,
agents become less change averse when their income cannot be expropriated and thus
larger and larger concessions from the elite are necessary to avoid any upheaval. We
show that the higher human capital is in a country, the more the elite use populist
policies aimed at garnering the support of the poor and the larger are the franchise
extensions which the elite use to counter a revolutionary threat. While we derive the
mechanism linking human capital and democratisation by looking at 19th century
Europe it might play an important role more generally, notably in the wave of
democratisations in Latin America in the 1980s and in the current Arab uprisings.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of the 19th century no European country had any signicant degree of
democracy but by the 1920s a large number had introduced universal male su¤rage. On
the road from autocracy to democracy nearly all Western countries had varying degrees
of what we might call partial democracy: Voting was restricted to males with a certain
income or social standing. The timing and extent of franchise extensions varied from
country to country. The emergence of human capital as a key source of income, we will
argue, caused an important shift in incentives for the middle classes which in turn was an
important factor in European democratisation. The shift from assets to human capital
as the main source of income meant that it became optimal for the middle classes to
support change and the elite reacted optimally to this new situation by extending the
franchise. Since human capital is not expropriatable in the way land is the middle classes
became less change averse. Our model shows that the revolutionary threat posed by a
social group does not necessarily have to be decreasing in their income as assumed in
the seminal Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) model. This then implies that depending on
the social structure of a country, more or less deprived social groups pose the marginal
revolutionary threat.1 The poorer this marginal group the more likely a large franchise
extension. The elite will aim to disperse the threat of a revolution by dissuading the
marginal group from starting a revolution. If the poor are the marginal group the rich
dissuade them from a revolution by a large franchise extension. If on the other hand
the middle class pose the marginal revolutionary threat the elites will only partially
extend the franchise. Intuitively, in a society which has low human capital and a large
dependence on land, revolutions are more attractive for poorer individuals since land
redistribution o¤ers an easy way for the poor to benet after a revolution. When human
capital is crucial in determining income levels then a revolution does little for the poor
since it is not transferable in the way land is. A well educated middle class on the other
hand has all the more to gain from the new opportunities which arise when the old elite
are overthrown.
We build on the contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005) and
Boix (2003) which stress the threat of revolution from disenfranchised classes as the key
driver of democratisation. We argue that it is important to pay attention to what exactly
happens after a revolution and how this might a¤ect incentives to start and participate
in a revolution. Clearly, abstracting from any collective action problems, a revolution
is only individually rational if people expect to gain from it. As Tullock (1971) points
1The marginal social group is the group most easily dissuaded from starting a revolution.
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out, people are likely to consider the expected private gains and losses when deciding
whether to participate in a revolution and not the public-good character of a revolution.
Modelling post-revolutionary payo¤s more carefully thus seems crucial. By building up
the economic class structure of European societies from historical evidence and then
considering how the source of income of di¤erent classes a¤ects their incentives to par-
ticipate in revolutions we make a twofold contribution. First, our model can help to
explain both the pattern of cross-country di¤erences in the speed and extent of franchise
extensions and the overall trend towards larger franchise extensions by linking them to
the di¤erent development of human capital between countries and over time. Secondly,
we rationalise the importance often attributed to the middle class for democratisation.
For example, Lipset (1959) notes that a strong middle class and high levels of education
are crucial for democracy. He explains this by the mediating role the middle class can
play in conicts between the poor and the elite and the fact that education furthers ideas
which support democracy. We describe a novel mechanism for Lipsets modernization
hypothesis. Education increases human capital and because human capital is not ex-
propriatable in the way assets are this makes agents more willing to risk moving away
from the political status quo. We argue that depending on their source of income, the
middle classes can either be natural allies of the elite or on the contrary be the group
which has the most to gain from franchise extensions. We show that only if the middle
class are well educated and thus have a high level of human capital are they a force for
regime change. A large middle class who derive their income mainly from assets is likely
to support the status quo. This mechanism is applicable much more generally than 19th
century European franchise extensions. Specically, we argue that it might help explain
the current upheavals in the Middle East as well as the wave of democratisations in Latin
America in the 1980s.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 gives a short historical overview of European fran-
chise extensions and of class structure in 19th century Europe. Section 3 then discusses
related literature. Section 4 presents and solves the model and discusses the main results
and their wider applicability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical Overview
During the 19th and early parts of the 20th century a majority of European countries
moved from an oligarchic political system controlled by a small elite to a full democracy,
often via several stages of partial democracy. As Tilly (2004) observes, there was usually
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a gap of several decades between the establishment of parliamentary representation and
full manhood su¤rage. The speed and degree of franchise extension varied considerably
between European countries during the 19th century (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova,
2006). Britain is the classical example for gradual franchise extensions.2 The Reform
Acts of 1832, 1867, 1884 and 1918 allowed more and more men to vote in democratic
elections. In 1832 the majority of the population was still excluded but the Great Reform
Act extended the franchise to some relatively wealthy parts of the middle classes. Overall
the electorate comprised 3.5% of the male population then. This franchise extension
had been preceded by half a century of popular mobilisation backing political reform.
The next Reform Act in 1867 then enfranchised larger parts of the population but still
used property and income restrictions to exclude the poorer segments of society. Full
manhood su¤rage was nally reached in 1918. Most other European countries also
gradually extended the franchise. In Italy, for example, economic restrictions on who
could vote where only lifted in 1919, 80 years after the rst elections. A similar pattern,
albeit with varying restrictions and timing of franchise extensions, can be observed in
Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands and Belgium. In Sweden, for example, a limited
democracy was installed in 1866 and nearly full manhood su¤rage was reached in 1909.
Generally speaking, most European countries had introduced full male su¤rage by the
1920s. It is also worth noting that similarly to Britain initially only very small fractions
of the male population could vote in other countries. In 1861 only 7.9% of male adults
could vote in Italy and in 1830 only 90,000 French men out of a population of 31 million
formed the electorate (Pilbeam, 1990). In Belgium 4.5% of males were allowed to vote
in 1831 (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova, 2006).3
Some countries seem to o¤er an exception to the gradual franchise extension model.
Switzerland, for example, introduced full democracy at once in 1848 and similarly in
Germany there were no economic limitations on who could vote from the rst time there
were elections held in a united German state in 1871. Upon closer inspection it becomes
apparent, however, that those countries too went through a phase of restricted franchise.
As Tilly (2004) notes, on a local level property restrictions existed in Switzerland prior to
full manhood su¤rage in 1848. During the 18th century only 200,000 out of roughly 1.6
million people had the rights to participate in public politics. Similarly, elections to the
2We only discuss franchise extensions by class and not by gender throughout the paper. In Europe
women tended to be enfrachised post-WWI and the rationale for female enfrachisement might have have
been quite di¤erent than that for franchise extensions by class. See, for example, Bertocchi (2011) for a
contribution to the literature on female enfrachisement.
3Su¤rage restirctions based on income or wealth were also very common throughout the Americas,
including the US. See Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2012) for a detailed and very insightful discussion of
enfranchisement in the Americas.
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Prussian national assembly were property restricted when they were introduced in 1808.
While all countries thus seem to have gone through some form of partial democracy there
are large and interesting di¤erences in the speed and extent of franchise extension worth
explaining.4 It is important to note that we use a very narrow denition of democracy:
We qualify a country as a full democracy if de jure all male citizens have one vote. Clearly
this is not a perfect measure of democracy since for example Germany post 1870 had
a very large franchise de jure but not de facto.5 Furthermore, in a more sophisticated
measure of democracy we would want to include an understanding of freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, access to politics, etc. However, since all of those are more di¢ cult
to measure and the size of the franchise does seem to be the single most important
measure of democracy we follow most of the literature in political economy by using the
terms full franchise and full democracy interchangeably.
In light of the above discussion we can di¤erentiate between two broad groups of
countries. One in which the middle class and working class were enfranchised more or
less at the same time (eg Germany, Switzerland) and one in which the working class were
enfranchised signicantly after the middle class (eg Britain, Italy). As an illustration
consider the following two graphs which show the de jure electorate as a percentage of
its reference age and sex group. Figure 1 shows the group of countries which passed
through partial democracy and Figure 2 shows the group of countries in which the
middle class and (most) of the working class were enfranchised at the same time. We
can see that the UK stands out as having the most gradual approach while Belgium
is noteworthy for having had a very limited electorate until the very late 19th century.
France, Germany, Denmark and Switzerland had one large franchise extension and from
there on a more or less constant electorate. Overall for the period 1815 to 1920 the
trend towards full enfranchisement is very clear. Towards the second decade of the
20th century all countries had lifted most income and property restrictions so that rich,
middle class and poor men all had a vote.
It is worth looking at what it meant to be upper, middle and working class in 19th
century Europe to try and discern some explanations for the cross-country variation in
democratisation and the general trend towards full democracy over time. The upper
class, or elite, were mostly aristocracy and derived the largest part of their income
4Looking at franchise extensions for the whole world, Przeworski (2009) identies 185 franchise ex-
tensions by class for the period 1793 to 2000.
5 In Prussia and a few smaller regions of Germany the so-called three-class franchise divided the
electorate into three groups based on how many taxes each person paid. The top group comprised all
those who contributed to paying the top third of taxes. Each group could then vote for the same number
of electors. Hypothetically, one very rich person who paid a third of all taxes collected by the state
would, therefore, have been able to vote for a third of all electors on her own.
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Figure 1: Electorate as a percentage of the reference age and sex group over time. Data
from Aidt and Jensen (2010).
Figure 2: Electorate as a percentage of the reference age and sex group over time. Data
from Aidt and Jensen (2010).
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from land (Pilbeam, 1990). Land was considered the prime asset since it was safe and
protable. In fact, a market for land as we know it today, had not yet developed in
all European countries so that land was mostly acquired through bequests. The lower
class was made up of peasants, labourers and workers with no or a low level of education
and no or very little property.6 These lower classes made up the vast majority of the
population in all European countries. In between the elite and the lower classes were
the middle classes. The term is not exact in its denition and in fact incorporates many
layers within it. Marx distinguished between two main groups of middle classes, the old
middle classesor petty bourgeoisieand the new middle classes (Giddens, 1973). The
old middle classesare dened as small property owners whereas the new middle classes
are propertyless and rely on a salary. Similarly, Weber di¤erentiates between small
property-owners and white collar workers within the middle class. Kocka (1995), from
the viewpoint of a modern historian rather than a contemporary sociologist, splits the
middle classes into two subgroups: the Bildungsbuergertumor educated middle class
and the Wirtschaftsbuergertumor economic middle class. The gist of the distinction
is the same as in Marx and Weber, some groups within the middle classes derive their
income from smallish property and land holdings while others derive their income from
human capital which they have developed in education. Although the middle classes were
not a homogenous group, Kocka observes that they slowly developed an attitude which
[stressed] the principles of achievement and education, work and self-reliance, a vision
of a modern, secularised, post-corporate, self-regulating, enlightened "civil society"and
opposed the privileges and autocracy of the ancien regime.
Two important trends can be observed throughout the century. Firstly, the overall
number of middle class citizens consistently grew and secondly the importance and size
of the old middle classwithin the middle classes strongly decreased. Weber notes that
the category of small property-owners tends to become progressively more restricted
with the increasing maturity of capitalism. This implies that human capital replaced
property as the main source of income for the middle classes. As an example for the
expansion in human capital it can be noted that the number of university students
in Germany more than tripled in the 19th century and the very large majority of these
students were from a middle-class (often old middle class) background (Pilbeam, 1990).
Government spending on basic education also signicantly increased in the latter half
of the 19th century (Galor and Moav, 2006). Both the size of the middle class and
6According to Mitch (1993) only half of all adults could sign their name at marriage in England at
the beginning of the 19th century.
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the importance of human capital for their income thus increased at the same time as
democratisation was advancing in Europe and larger and larger segments of society were
enfranchised. The model in section 4 will link these historical observation and will put
forward the hypothesis that the change in the size and composition of the middle class
was an important factor for the extension of the franchise.
3 Related Literature
Various explanations have been given in the economic, political and sociological liter-
ature to try and explain why and when democratisation occurs. In political economy
we can divide the literature into two broad groups: those which stress the importance
of involuntary franchise extension and those which argue that the elites extended the
franchise largely voluntarily (Przeworski, 2009). The most inuential contribution to
the former group are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005)7 who build on some
of the ideas developed by Moore (1966), North and Weingast (1989) and Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens (1992) among others. Their key contention is that democratisa-
tion occurs as a consequence of a revolutionary threat from the disenfranchised classes.
Poorer citizens want a higher level of redistribution from rich to poor than that which
the current rulers engage in.8 The elites would ideally prefer to remain in an autocracy
but since redistributive promises they make in an autocracy are not entirely credible
they have to democratise in order to avoid a revolution. AR use various historical exam-
ples to show that the threat of revolution tended to be a powerful catalyst for su¤rage
extension. A similar argument is made by Conley and Temini (2001) who argue that
the elites extend the franchise when the cost to them of doing so is smaller than that
of a revolution. Conley and Temini show that when the disenfranchised group is weak
there will never be a franchise extension since the enfranchised group is not threatened.
When the disenfranchised group is strong, however, enfranchisement depends on the de-
gree of conict between the two groups. A higher degree of conict makes it both more
desirable for the disenfranchised to get a say and more costly for the enfranchised to re-
linquish their privilege. This leads to a non-monotonic relationship between the degree
of conict and enfranchisement. Boix (2003) also bases his analysis on the redistributive
demands of the poorer classes. He shows that higher inequality makes democratisation
less likely since repression is relatively less costly for the elites when inequality is high.
7AR from here on.
8ARs model also builds on the work by Meltzer and Richard (1981) who show that a franchise
extension will increase redistribution since it makes the median voter poorer and thus supportive of a
higher tax rate.
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Furthermore, Boix stresses the importance of asset mobility for democratisation. When
the elite hold highly immobile assets (for example land) then it is very di¢ cult for them
to avoid paying high levels of taxation in a democracy and they thus strongly oppose
it. If on the other hand assets are more mobile then taxes in a democracy are limited
by the threat of asset relocation. Distinguishing between the transferability of di¤erent
asset classes is an important point which we use in our model to explain the changing
incentives of the middle classes in the 19th century.9
The literature on voluntary or "from above" franchise extension, on the other hand,
discusses several reasons why it might be optimal for part or the whole elite to extend the
franchise even in the absence of any revolutionary threat. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) take
the view that franchise extensions occur voluntarily because some of the elite can benet
from it through a shift in government spending towards public goods. They distinguish
between government spending ad personam and public good spending and argue that
when the value of the public good increases it can become optimal for a majority of
the elite to extend the franchise to incentivise the government to spend on the public
good rather than personal transfers from which only the swing voters benet. As an
example for an increase in the value of public goods Lizzeri and Persico cite the need for
public health in Britains urban centers in the 19th century which as a consequence of
industrialisation had become overcrowded and infected with mainly water born diseases.
In a slightly di¤erent approach Aidt, Daunton and Dutta (2010) construct a model where
the elite might want to voluntarily extend the franchise because doing so increases the
tax base to include the middle class and the elite thus do not have to handle the full tax
burden. They show that the franchise is voluntarily extended if it results in a Pareto
improvement.
In a very interesting contribution to the voluntary franchise extension literature
Llavador and Oxoby (2005) explain di¤erent degrees of franchise extension by di¤erent
preferences within the ruling elite.10 Conservative landowners and liberal capitalists have
conicting policy preferences and will thus try to extend or restrict the franchise as best
suits their policy goals. Conservatives either restrict the franchise to the elite or fully
extend it, while liberals prefer partial franchise extensions such that the median voter
favours pro-industry policies. Depending on the structure of the society the franchise is
thus extended to a larger or smaller degree. Llavador and Oxobys model is particularly
insightful since it can explain di¤erent degrees of franchise extensions. Boixs model of
9Ellis and Fender (2010) have also noted the fact that human capital is intrinsically di¤erent from
other forms of capital since it cannot be expropriated.
10Collier (1999) also argues that part of the elite might want to extend the franchise for partisan
reasons.
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involuntary franchise extensions (2003) also allows for partial su¤rage extensions but
o¤ers the exact opposite conclusions in terms of franchise extension preferences. If the
assets of capitalists are signicantly more mobile than those of the landowners, the capi-
talists might enter an alliance with the poor and push for full democracy at the expense
of the landowners. Perhaps the most forceful recent contribution to the voluntary fran-
chise extension literature is Congletons book "Perfecting Parliament" (2011). He argues
that an existing constitutional environment is only changed through an intra-elite bar-
gaining process when it is mutually benecial for the elite to do so. In his view, the
new economies of scale in production which came up in the 19th century provided a
shock which markedly pushed gradual reform towards liberal outcomes. Revolutionary
pressures only played a marginal role.
It does seem, however, that the repeated occurrence of revolutions in Europe and
elsewhere and their often quite substantial impact on the elite as well as the striking
timing of franchise extensions following popular mobilisation o¤er strong support for the
importance of explanations based on involuntary franchise extension. In fact, Przeworski
(2009) compares the empirical prediction of several models of franchise extension and
concludes that the enfranchisement of poorer classes would not have occurred if it were
not for some sort of revolutionary threat. He uses a variable which measures social
unrest in a country and nds that its lagged value has a strong positive impact on
franchise extensions by class. Przeworskis analysis focuses on the post-1917 period but
Aidt and Jensen (2010) conrm his results for the period from 1820-1938. By using
contentious situations in neighbouring countries they construct an exogenous measure
of the perceived revolutionary threat level and nd that this measure strongly impacts
su¤rage extensions.11 They conclude that the threat of revolution was a major cause
of franchise extension during the rst wave of democratisation in Europe. Similarly,
Weyland (2010) argues that a successful revolution in one country has strong spill-
over e¤ects and in 19th century Europe often lead to preemptive su¤rage extensions in
the neighbouring countries. In light of the above evidence we thus take the view that
revolutionary threats have an important part to play in explaining many instances of
democratisation.
Both the importance of the middle classes and of education for democratisation has
received a substantial amount of attention in the political and sociological literature.
In a classic paper Lipset (1959) argues that education is important for democratisation
since the higher ones education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values
11Also see Aidt and Franck (2008) for an empirical test of the di¤erent theories proposed to explain
the 1832 Great Reform Act in Britain.
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and support democratic practices. Lipset sees the importance of the middle classes
in their ability to mediate between elite and poor and thereby generate a democratic
outcome. Huntington (1991) comes to a similar conclusion about the moderating e¤ect
of the middle classes as does Moore (1966) in his seminal contribution to the literature
on democratisation. We propose a novel mechanism through which education leads
to democratisation by increasing human capital and thereby making agents politically
less change averse. Throughout most of the paper we focus on 19th century franchise
extensions and show that the composition of the middle class in the 19th century was an
important factor in determining democratisation. However, the mechanism we describe
is likely to be much more widely applicable as we discuss in Subsection 4.3.5.
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Galor and Moav (2006) o¤er an explanation
for why education and thus human capital expanded in the second half of the 19th
century. They argue that the elite furthered human capital accumulation because this
beneted their prot rates due to complementarities between physical and human capital
accumulation. At the same time the elite were aware that citizens with a higher human
capital are likely to be more politically active. In their view the elite thus consciously
undermined their own position on the social ladder in return for higher prots. In
their models it is exogenously assumed that education is a pre-condition for political
participation. We complement their research by showing what one possible mechanism
linking higher education (and thus higher human capital) to franchise extensions could
be.
4 The Model
In this section we introduce our model and solve it to prove the main results referred
to in previous sections. In Subsection 4.1 we outline the basic setup of the model and
in Subsection 4.2 we then discuss how we extend the standard model which is now used
widely in the literature by incorporating the historical facts discussed in Section 2. Once
we have claried the core assumptions we proceed by solving the model in Subsection
4.3.
4.1 Basic Setup
We follow the classic AR (2005) framework where democratisation occurs as a conse-
quence of a revolutionary threat. There are three groups: rich (r), middle class (m) and
poor (p). Group i has measure mi and total population is equal to
P
i
mi = 1: Each indi-
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vidual of group i has an exogenous pre-tax income of yi where yr > ym > yp so that each
rich individual has more income than a middle class individual who has more income
than a poor one. Furthermore, mp;mm > mr and mp > 1=2. This is the situation which
according to Kocka applies to all European countries in the 19th century. In line with
the income distribution of most countries we also assume that it is skewed towards the
right (mean income is higher than median income), i.e. mpyp+mmym+mryr = y > yM
where yM is median income.12
The state levies an income tax  on all incomes and uses the revenue to nance a
transfer T: At a tax rate of  there is an aggregate deadweight loss of C()y where
C 0() > 0; C 00() > 0 , C(0) = 0; C 0(0) = 0 and C 0(1) = 1 so that the deadweight
loss is a convex function of the tax level, costs are very low at low levels of taxation
and prohibitively high when  is close to 1. The governments budget constraint is
T = mpyp + mmym + mryr   C()y = (   C())y: Individuals have linear utility
functions which are increasing in post-tax income and transfers U(yi;  ; T ) = (1 )yi+T:
Substituting for T using the governments budget constraint U(yi; ) = (1  )yi + (  
C())y:
The society is originally an autocracy ruled by the rich which means they are un-
constrained to choose their preferred tax rate ( r). Maximising U(yr; ) w.r.t.  gives a
corner solution since yr > y: Utility of an individual in group i is therefore simply equal
to yi in autocracy: Similarly we can derive the preferred tax rate of the middle class
m and that of the poor p by maximising U(ym; ) and U(yp; ); respectively. Given
our assumptions on mean income, median income and the measure of the groups we get
interior solutions such that p > m > 0:
The disenfranchised citizens can pose a revolutionary threat to the regime, using
sheer numerical superiority to overthrow it. We assume that a revolution is only suc-
cessful if both middle class and poor agents participate. An individual will engage in
a revolution only if it is individually rational for him to do so, i.e. when his expected
post-revolutionary utility is higher than his status quo utility. Note that we abstract
from the collective action problem.
The game is static and the timing is as follows:
1. The elites decide whether to stay in an autocracy, partially democratise (enfran-
chise the middle class) or fully democratise.
12 In practice we also make the slightly stronger assumption that y > ym; so that the preferred tax
rate of the middle class is positive.
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2. If the elites decided to remain in an autocracy, they decide what tax rate to set.
If the elites partially democratised then the rich and middle class agents vote on a
tax rate.
If the elites fully democratised then all agents vote on a tax rate.
3. The middle class and the poor simultaneously decide whether to start a revolution.
4. In an autocracy the rich can reset the tax rate with probability (1  p) since they
keep political power and promises are thus not entirely credible.
5. Payo¤s are realised.
Note that stage 4 occurs because as in Boix (2003) and in the AR model, the rich
face a commitment problem under autocracy; with a certain probability 1  p they can
reset the promised tax rate once the revolutionary threat has subsided. p thus measures
the level of commitment. In fact, the probability 1   p arises because we are using the
reduced form of a fully dynamic model in which the middle class and the poor are only
organised enough to stage a revolution with a certain probability less than 1 in any given
period. What we are trying to capture is that if the institutional arrangement (political
power) does not change then as soon as there is no imminent threat of a revolution the
elite might simply decide to renege on their promises. Since the middle class and the
poor foresee this, promises made under autocracy are not entirely credible. While the
interpretation of p is thus slightly more intuitive in a repeated game setting it does not
o¤er any insights beyond those of the static model and comes at the cost of reduced
analytical tractability (AR, 2005).
Some of the above assumptions warrant a further discussion. We will outline in turn
the reasoning for the assumption on when revolutions are successful, the collective action
problem and the options which the rich have to avoid a revolution.
The assumption that both middle class and working class are necessary for a suc-
cessful revolution is standard in the literature. And in fact, most revolutions do take
place when cross-class coalitions are formed. The French and Russian revolutions for
example were marked by a very important bourgeois contribution (Pilbeam, 1990 and
Wade, 2005). While the working class provide the critical mass of people necessary for
a popular upheaval, the middle class can provide leadership, vision, organisation and
motivation for a revolution. Tilly (2001), for example, notes that cross-class coalitions
frequently create or expand revolutionary situations. In terms of the model, poor and
middle class agents play a simultaneous move game in stage 3. The assumption that
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both groups are necessary for a successful revolution determines the structure of that
game by specifying that only when it is a Nash Equilibrium for both to participate in
the revolution is the revolution successful.13
While the collective action problem plays a prominent role in the study of revolutions,
abstracting from it on an intra-group level is standard in the political economy literature
on involuntary franchise extensions. One way to think about how the collective action
problem is solved in the context of our model is to assume that each group has a political
activist who decides on whether or not the group should participate in a revolution. Once
the political activist has made the decision for the group as a whole, each member of the
group is committed to taking part (AR, 2005). The literature suggests several ways how
groups can solve their internal collective action problem. Among the most prominent
are ideological indoctrination (Olson 1965) or excluding members of the group who did
not participate in the collective action from benets which arise from it (AR, 2005).
In fact, in a recent paper Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) question the consensus about
the severity of the collective action problem facing rebels. They argue that if non-
participation is costly as it might well be since insurgencies are marked by patterns of
violence that systematically, though variably, select nonparticipants for victimization,
then the collective action problem might not be as much of an issue as is commonly
assumed. What is crucial for our model is that through one of the ways set out in the
literature the groups do manage to solve their collective action problem whenever it is
individually-rational to have a revolution.
Lastly, while we assume that the rich can deal with the threat of revolution in two
ways only (by promising redistribution and by extending the franchise) in reality they
can also attempt to use repression to quell any threat to their power. However, we do
not pursue this possibility because it does not o¤er any additional interesting insights
beyond those already explored in the literature. If we assumed that repression was an
option for the rich and that there repression is costly then we would get the result that
when repression is su¢ ciently cheap the rich will use it as a tool but the more expensive
repression becomes (it could be a function of inequality for example) the more likely
the rich are to promise redistribution or extend the franchise. We thus choose to omit
repression altogether from the analysis to focus on the parts of the model where we add
to the literature.
13We focus on Nash Equlibria in weakly dominant strategies as do AR (2005). At most there are 2
NE in pure strategies in the game at stage 3, one of which is in weakly dominant strategies while the
other one is in weakly dominated strategies.
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4.2 The payo¤ from revolution
As the consequence of a revolution total income in the economy is reduced by a fraction
 so that it is (1  )y: This can be thought of as the upheaval destroying a part of the
economys productive assets for example.14 In the classic AR model of democratisation
it is assumed that after a successful revolution the middle class and the poor expropriate
the rich (and in fact all resources of the economy) and then divide the countrys wealth
equally between the mm + mp poor and middle class agents. The utility of a middle
class individual and a poor individual after a revolution is thus (1 )ymm+mp : E¤ectively this
implies that revolutions are signicantly more attractive for the poor. In autocracy the
income gap between middle class and poor is ym   yp > 0 and after a revolution it is
(1 )y
mm+mp
  (1 )ymm+mp = 0:
The above assumption can be questioned on a number of grounds. First of all, it
seems to contradict empirical evidence on post-revolution payo¤s. Goldstone (2001) in a
survey article and Kelley and Klein (1977) present evidence that the ones who are better
o¤ after a revolution are the ones who were better o¤ before already (i.e. the middle
class have higher income than the poor after a revolution). The main explanation o¤ered
in the literature is that the middle class tend to be the better educated and the returns
from education tend to be at least as high after a revolution as they were before. The
new government needs to employ administrators and new entrepreneurs replace the old
elite, thereby making the middle class better o¤ than the poor who are not in a position
to capitalise on the new opportunities.
Secondly, the assumption of equal post-revolution payo¤s is di¢ cult to sustain if the
middle class can retain some land or physical capital after the revolution. Bar a complete
breakdown in property rights and redistribution of land the middle class would be better
o¤ than the poor even if we disregard the e¤ect of superior human capital.
In fact, the above empirical evidence can be show to be naturally consistent with the
discussion of class structures and income sources in section 2. As established above the
elite largely derived their income from their land holdings (LHr), i.e.
yr = LHr:
The poor get their income from unskilled human capital income which we dene as
yp for convenience. Lastly, the middle class are made up of small-scale property holders
14We think of  as the cost of revolution and let it a¤ect all forms of assets as well as human capital.
This can be easily rationalised considering complementarities between various forms of capital.
15
which derive their income mainly from some form of asset (assume land for simplicity
of notation (LHm)) and white collar workers which earn skilled human capital income
made up of unskilled human capital income and a skill premium (HCm = yp+SP ). We
could thus express ym as15
ym = HCm + LHm
= yp + SP + LHm:
We thus capture the fact that the middle class as a whole has two sources of income,
its human capital and its asset holdings.16 Now the crucial di¤erence between human
capital and other assets, notably land, which was also pointed out by Boix (2003) and
Ellis and Fender (2010), is that while land can be easily expropriated, human capital is
largely non-transferable and non-expropriatable.
Having specied the economys asset allocation we can now proceed to establish what
happens after a revolution. All assets which can be expropriated are indeed expropriated
and middle class and poor agents then decide how to split them.17 It is natural to think
about this as some sort of bargaining process between middle class and poor individuals.
In practice these would be decisions regarding the tax system, group specic transfers,
etc.18
Prior to redistributing the expropriated resources the income of agents is thus as
follows. A rich agent looses all his assets and therefore has an income of yer = 0:
19
The income of a poor agent is unchanged so that yep = yp and lastly the income of a
representative middle class agent is yem = yp + SP: Now, note that we can rewrite the
15Clearly yr > ym requires LHr >> LHm: This is exactly what we oberve in historical data since the
large majority of assets where held by a small elite.
16Since the middle class solve their internal collective action problem and act as one group it does
not matter if we di¤erentiate between two types of middle class agents or assume that each middle class
agent has two sources of income.
17This ts in with the observation by Goldstone that the most frequent economic change after a
revolution is a redistribution of land.
18Alternatively, it might also be reasonable to assume that the rich are expropriated to a greater extent
than the middle class. If the middle class are not expropriated at all their behaviour is independent
of what their source of income is. However, as long as there is some uncertainty over who will be
expropriated the original intuition holds and the incentives of the middle class are di¤erent when they
have expropriatable instead of inexpropriatable capital. We opt for full expropriation of all expropriatable
assets to get the most analytically tractable results.
19 It would be more realistic to assume that the rich also earn the income they can derive from human
capital after a revolution. We sidestep this since it makes most expressions more cumbersome without
adding any extra insights.
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latter so that
yem = yp + (1  )ym
where
 =
LHm
LHm + SP
:
This means that in a situation where the middle class are made up entirely of small-scale
property owners, SP = 0 and consequently  = 1: When on the other hand the middle
class consists exclusively of propertyless white collar workers then LHm = 0 and thus
 = 0: For all combinations of SP and LHm  2 [0; 1]: Note that for  to fall it is not
necessary that LHm decreases, it is su¢ cient if SP; i.e. education or the return from
education, rises.
If the middle class and the poor cannot agree on how to split the economys expropri-
ated assets they remain with the incomes they have bar these assets. To get the simplest
possible results we will assume that how to split the expropriated assets is determined by
multiplayer Nash Bargaining. Nash bargaining relies on the assumption that given the
disagreement point the players optimally divide the overall pie to reach a point on the
e¢ cient frontier. Since the disagreement point is equal to zero for every agent the expro-
priated assets are simply split equally between all agents. This implies that each poor
and each middle class agent gets (1 )(mmLHm+mrLHr)(mm+mp) from the expropriated assets.
20
Noting that y = yrmr+ymmm+ypmp andmrLHr+mmLHm = yrmr+mm(ym yp SP )
we can plug into the above to get
(1  )(mmLHm +mrLHr)
(mm +mp)
=
(1  )(y   yp(mp + mm)  ymmm(1  ))
(mm +mp)
:
Given the above discussion the total income of a poor agent after a revolution is then
(1  )(y   yp(mp + mm)  ymmm(1  ) + (mp +mm)yp)
(mm +mp)
=
(1  )(y + (1  )mm(yp   ym))
(mm +mp)
: (1)
20A more elaborate mechanism might assign a greater fraction to either middle class or poor individ-
uals. The middle class might end up with a greater fraction if the leaders of the revolution are middle
class for example, and the poor might be able to increase their share if their numerical superiority gives
them an advantage in the bargaining process. The former scenario makes revolutions more attractive for
the middle class and thus makes full franchise extensions more likely while the later makes full franchise
extensions less likely.
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and that of a middle class agent is
(1  )(y + (1  )mp(ym   yp))
(mm +mp)
: (2)
Having derived our results from historical observations about the asset allocation
between classes we get the result which is suggested by empirical evidence. The post-
revolution payo¤ of a middle class agent is generally higher than that of a poor agent
because of the formers higher human capital. The degree to which a middle class agent
is better o¤ crucially depends on ; and is monotonically decreasing in : When  = 1
(i.e. SP = 0) then middle class and poor agents are equally well-o¤ after a revolution.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We show that a lower
 is associated with larger franchise extensions. After the mathematical analysis of the
model we discuss the intuition and historical relevance of the results. The formal proofs
are in the Appendix.
First, note that to maximise their own utility the rich will try to avoid a revolution
at all cost since their payo¤ after a revolution is 0. Furthermore, since their utility is
decreasing in the tax rate they will aim for the lowest possible  which achieves this.
We proceed as follows. First, we outline the crucial parameter regions and the
optimal behaviour of the middle class and the poor after the rich choose Autoracy,
Partial Democracy and Democracy respectively. We then solve for the equilibrium.
4.3.1 Autocracy
If either the middle class or the poor have a higher utility under autocracy than after a
revolution then there is no revolutionary threat. This is the case if either
yp >
(1  )(y +mm(1  )(yp   ym))
(mm +mp)
; (3)
or
ym >
(1  )(y +mp(1  )(ym   yp))
(mm +mp)
: (4)
Rearranging we can see that the poor are indi¤erent between a revolution and the
status quo for
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P;1 =
y   (1  )ymmm   yp(mp + mm)
y +mm(1  )(yp   ym) (5)
and the middle class are indi¤erent for
M;1 =
y   (1  )ypmp   ym(mm + mp)
y +mp(1  )(ym   yp) (6)
Clearly, for all values of  < 1 it is true that P;1 > M;1; 21 so that the poor always
pose more of a revolutionary threat than the middle class unless the middle class derive
no income at all from human capital. This is intuitive since the poor have less to lose
than the middle class as their status quo is worse. Note that the larger is the income
gap between poor and middle class agents (ym  yp) the larger is the di¤erence between
P;1 and M;1:When  > M;1 then the rich are unconstrained and therefore simply set
their most preferred tax rate  r = 0: However, if the cost of a revolution is lower than
this, then both the middle class and the poor prefer a revolution to the status quo. The
rich, therefore, have to make some concessions in terms of setting a higher tax rate or
even democratising.
The rich can avoid a revolution by promising a tax rate 2 if either
p[(1  2)yp + (2   C(2))y] + (1  p)yp > (1  )(y +mm(1  )(yp   ym))
(mm +mp)
; (7)
or
p[(1  2)ym + (2   C(2))y] + (1  p)ym > (1  )(y +mp(1  )(ym   yp))
(mm +mp)
: (8)
Rearranging (7) and (8) we nd M;2 and P;2. Both M;2 and P;2 are functions of
the promised tax rate 2: M;2(2) is thus the level of  at which the middle class are
indi¤erent between autocracy with promised redistribution at tax rate 2 and a revolu-
tion and P;2(2) is the level of  at which the poor are indi¤erent between autocracy
with promised redistribution at tax rate 2 and a revolution.
Whenever M;2 > P;2 it is easier to satisfy the demands of the poor than those of
21We use the notation i;1 for the revolution cost at which an agent from group i 2 fM;Pg is
indi¤erent between a revolution and autocracy without redistribution. Similarly i;2; i;3 and i;4
specify indi¤erence between autocracy with redistribution and a revolution, partial democracy and a
revolution and full democracy and a revolution, respectively.
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the middle class. Noting that M;2 P;2 is a decreasing function of a and an increasing
function of p and 2 we nd that a higher share of human capital in the income of a
middle class agent and a higher level of commitment make it more likely that the rich
appease the poor instead of the middle class to avoid a revolution.
Proposition 1 Above a certain threshold value for taxes ( co) the poor become the mar-
ginal social group (M;2 > P;2 ). A lower  and a higher p increase the parameter range
for which M;2 > P;2.
The rich will choose 2 such that either (7) or (8) is satised as an equality. Since
the utility of the rich is decreasing in  they will want to have the outcome with the
lowest possible tax rate and since our above analysis shows that for low tax rates it is
cheaper to buy-o¤ the middle class they would prefer to do so. If (8) holds for some
2 2 (0; m] then the rich will choose such a 2 given that  co > 2: If the necessary
2 >  co then the rich choose 2 to make (7) hold as an equality. If at m neither (7)
nor (8) hold and if  co < p then the rich choose 2 2 (m; p] to make (7) hold. If on
the other hand at m neither (7) nor (8) hold and if  co > p then a revolution cannot
be avoided by promising redistribution and the rich have to democratise. This is the
case when  < minfP;2; M;2g.
As an illustration consider the following two graphs. The top line represents P;2
and the bottom line represents M;2: In Figure 3(a)  = p = 0:5 and we can see that no
matter how much taxes the rich promise P;2 > M;2 so that the poor are always more
di¢ cult to dissuade from a revolution ( co > 1) and the rich bribe the middle class since
this is cheaper. In Figure 3(b) where  = 0:1 and p = 0:9 we can see that  co 2 (0:1):
Note that while for certain  and p it can be possible to buy-o¤ the poor but not the
middle class, we have established above that the revolutionary threat of the poor absent
any redistribution is always at least as great as that of the middle class, i.e. P;1  M;1:
That we can get P;2 < M;2 is due to the fact the utility of the poor is increasing in
taxation for  r >  > m while the utility of the middle class is decreasing over this
range.
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3(a) Illustration of P;2 and M;2
when  = 0:5 and p = 0:5: The
Middle Class are the marginal social
group for all tax rates.
3(b) Illustration of P;2 and M;2
when  = 0:1 and p = 0:9: Above a
certain tax rate the poor are the
marginal social group.
4.3.2 Partial Democracy
Since by denition the middle class are more numerous than the rich the median voter
is a middle class agent. Since we are facing a unidimensional voting problem the median
voter is the decisive one and in partial democracy the equilibrium tax rate will be m:
Whether partial democratisation can prevent a revolution depends on whether
(1  m)yp + (m   C(m))y > (1  )(y +mm(1  )(yp   ym))
(mm +mp)
(9)
or
(1  m)ym + (m   C(m))y > (1  )(y +mp(1  )(ym   yp))
(mm +mp)
(10)
The trade-o¤ here for the middle class and the poor is whether they are better o¤
in a partial democracy where the tax rate is m or whether they get a higher payo¤ by
expropriating the economys assets and then bargaining over how to split them. It is
important to note that the fact that the rich are expropriated means that the middle
class can prefer a revolution even when the rich partially democratise (i.e. the middle
class get their ideal tax rate).22
22This might seem counter-intuitive at rst but can easily be interpreted by noting the reasoning in
Subsection 4.2 which stressed the new opportunities which arise for the middle class once the old elite
has to be replaced. However, if we allowed for targeted taxes or transfers then clearly this would not
21
4.3.3 Democracy
The equilibrium tax rate in democracy is p > m: First note, that since the utility of
the middle class is decreasing in  for  > m; they are worse o¤ now then they are
under partial democracy. This means that they are now more likely to start a revolution
than they are in partial democracy. The poor on the other hand are strictly better
o¤ in democracy than in partial democracy and so are less likely to start a revolution.
Whether full democratisation can prevent a revolution depends on whether
(1  p)yp + (p   C(p))y > (1  )(y +mm(1  )(yp   ym))
(mm +mp)
(11)
or
(1  p)ym + (p   C(p))y > (1  )(y +mp(1  )(ym   yp))
(mm +mp)
(12)
Clearly, given the above discussion (9) is less likely to hold than (11) and (10) is
more likely to hold than (12).
4.3.4 Equilibrium
We have now put in place all the pieces to solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the game. For ease of presentation we break up the proposition which states the
equilibrium into sub-propositions and discuss each of those sub-propositions in turn.
Proposition 2 There is a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
2 (i) If  > M;1 there is no threat of revolution and the rich opt to remain in autocracy
without any redistribution.
2 (ii) If M;1 >  the rich promise the lowest possible tax rate such that either (7) or
(8) holds as an equality.
As mentioned above the rich are unconstrained and simply set their most preferred
tax rate  = 0 unless  < M;1. When the rich are forced to make concessions they
hold anymore. The middle class could then levy a special tax on the rich and transfer the income to
themselves. In general allowing for targeted taxes and transfers increases the relative attractivness of
autocracy for the rich and of partial democracy for the middle class. It also gives the rich in autocracy
and the middle class in partial democracy additional tools to consolidate their power by using targeted
transfers to the poor to dispel the threat of revolution. Democratisation is thus restricted to a smaller
parameter set relative to the case without targeted transfers.
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will try to avoid democratising by promising the lowest possible level of redistribution
which avoids a revolution. They do this as discussed in the autocracy section. When p
is su¢ ciently small and  su¢ ciently large then the middle class have higher demands
than the poor even though, a priori their preferences are more closely aligned with those
of the rich than those of the poor are. This result can help to explain why we frequently
observe autocratic regimes engage in populist policies aimed at garnering the support of
the poor rather than that of the middle class. An interesting trade-o¤ arises when the
rich need to o¤er 2 2 (m; p] to avoid democratisation: The rich then have to decide
whether they are willing to promise a higher tax rate than they would get in partial
democracy knowing that they have a chance of resetting it with probability (1   p):
They prefer to partially democratise if U(yr; m; p = 1)  U(yr; 2;P ; p); i.e.
(m   C(m))y   myr
(2;P   C(2;P ))y   2;P yr = p
  p (13)
When the probability of being able to reset the tax rate is su¢ ciently low the rich
prefer partial democratisation. If the rich can avoid democratisation by o¤ering a tax
rate 2;P  m then p  1 and clearly the rich will never voluntarily democratise.
When the rich need to o¤er a tax rate 2;P = p to avoid a revolution, then p = pH :
We thus get a mapping from 2;P 2 [m; p] to p 2 [pH ; 1] which denes the range of p
for which the rich voluntarily democratise.
There are two counteracting e¤ects at work here, however. The higher is p the more
likely the rich are to voluntarily democratise but also the lower is P;2; thereby making
it feasible to avoid democratisation for a larger set of revolution costs. This indicates a
non-linear relationship between the level of commitment and democratisation. On the
one hand a larger p makes the promises of the rich more credible and thus reduces the
commitment problem which leads to less democratisation. On the other hand, a larger
p leads the rich to prefer democratisation over autocracy in some case precisely because
they cannot reset the tax rate ex post. The rich are then willing to accept a relatively
high tax rate for sure rather than promising an even higher one in the hope of being
able to reset it.
When promising redistribution is not enough to avoid a revolution (or suboptimal
as discussed above) the rich democratise to make their promises credible. Whenever
possible the rich will opt for partial democracy over full democracy since it results in a
lower tax rate. However, it is possible that partial democracy does not avert a revolution
(neither (9) nor (10) are satised) and then the rich are forced to fully democratise.
2 (iii) If M;1 >  and either both (7) and (8) cannot be satised or (7) can be satised
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but p  p and either (9) or (10) are satised then the rich partially democratise.
2 (iv) If M;1 >  and neither (9) nor (10) are satised but (11) is satised then the rich
fully democratise.
Lastly, if a revolution is so attractive that the middle class prefer it to partial democ-
racy and the poor prefer it to full democracy then the rich cannot prevent it and a
revolution occurs in equilibrium.
2 (v) If M;1 >  and none of (9),(10), (11) or (12) are satised then there is a revo-
lution.
The key observation is that since the poor prefer a higher tax rate than the middle
class it is possible that the two groups have switched order and the poor become the
marginal revolutionary threat when we move from partial to full democracy. In other
words it is possible that (11) holds but (9), (10), and (12) do not hold. Intuitively, while
the middle class were less likely to start a revolution in partial democracy the poor are
less likely to do so in full democracy. There is thus a parameter range for which partial
democracy does not avoid a revolution but full democracy does. Noting that this is more
likely to be the case for a low  establishes our main result:
Proposition 3 For a high share of human capital in a middle class agents income (low
) there is a parameter region in which the rich will optimally choose to fully democratise
rather than partially democratise.
When the middle class rely on income from property then their interests are naturally
closely aligned with those of the rich since both have a lot to loose if assets are expropri-
ated after a revolution. However, if the middle class is made up mainly of propertyless
white-collar workers whos main asset is their human capital then they are much less
change averse since their assets cannot be expropriated.23 The rich might then have to
fully democratise to nd an ally in the poor to keep the demands of the middle classes
in check. Figure 4 illustrates the above discussion. The upward sloping line represents
M;3 while the downward sloping one represents P;4: As long as partial democracy can
avert a revolution that is the option the rich choose. However, for low values of  we get
the situation M;3 > P;4 and the rich are forced to fully extend the franchise to avoid
a revolution.
23Wades (2005) account of the Russian revolution corroborates this statement. He notes that nearly
all leaders of the revolution were from a white-collar background.
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Figure 4: SPNE of the game for a range of  and :
When the share of human capital in a middle class
agents income is su¢ ciently high it can be optimal for
the elite to fully rather than partially democratise.
(FD=Full Democracy, PD=Partial Democracy).
4.3.5 Discussion
19th Century Europe The model o¤ers a possible explanation for why some Euro-
pean countries fully extended the franchise while others only partly did so at a similar
time. Namely, countries in which the middle class had little property and high human
capital would be expected to have extended the franchise more fully early on. Ideally,
one would like to be able to formally test this hypothesis but there are severe data con-
straints since even data for a proxy such as school enrollment is not consistently available
prior to 1870 and there is hardly any cross-country data on asset holdings, human capi-
tal and income. Nevertheless, we can look at anecdotal evidence so see whether it is in
line with the models predictions. In Figure 2 we had identied four countries as full
franchise extension countries(Denmark, France, Germany and Switzerland). It is inter-
esting to note that this group contains the two countries in the world in which primary
schooling was rst made compulsory, namely Germany (Prussia) in 1763 and Denmark
in 1814 (Soysal and Strang, 1989). Furthermore, the 1833 Guizot Lawin France had
substantially increased the provision of schooling there, increasing human capital fteen
years prior to the 1848 franchise extension (Lynch. 1974). Lastly, also Switzerland was
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among the countries with the highest level of education in Europe in the early part of
the 19th century and was certainly far ahead of England in terms of schooling (Peterson,
1952). All this seems rather suggestive that human capital might have been higher in
those countries which fully extended the franchise early on. A further insight into the
level of human capital could be gained by comparing school enrollment rates between
the countries in our franchise extension sample. Using the earliest available measures
of enrollment rates (1870) we can calculate the average enrollment rate for the partial
franchise extension countriesand the full franchise extension countries. The average
for the latter is 68.5% compared to 53% in the former, a large and signicant di¤erence.
Unfortunately since the enrollment data is only consistently available for dates after
the rst franchise extensions have already taken place it is not clear whether perhaps
the observed correlation does not stem from countries with larger franchises voting for
more education. However, combined with the previous discussion on education levels
pre-dating franchise extensions it would seem that there is at least some evidence that
human capital was indeed higher in those countries which fully extended the franchise
early on.
A useful comparison can be made between Britain which gradually extended the
franchise through a series of reforms and Germany which introduced full male su¤rage
at once in 1871.24 In fact, Kockas historical account (1995) does indeed seem to suggest
that  was higher in Britain than in Germany. In Britain the middle classes were not
banned from acquiring land, while in most parts of Germany (notably Prussia) they
were. This created a situation in which the Bildungsbuergertumbecame the core of
the German middle classes. Hobsbawn (1993) notes that in Britain, on the other hand,
manufacturers in the expanding new industrial areas, were seen as the core of the middle
class. Furthermore, the English aristocracy and gentry were notoriously open to middle-
class marriages strengthening a bond based on the mutual interest in avoiding all to
abrupt change which could threaten property holdings. This is in contrast to Germanys
Wirtschaftsbuergertumwhich according to Kocka (1993) was confronted [...] with an
early-established, self-conscious and sometimes anti-capitalist Bildungsbuergertum. In
general the German middle classes placed a large importance on education and harboured
a sentiment of being distinctly di¤erent from the elite. Peterson (1952) notes that the
mid-nineteenth century rapporteur of the Board of Education in England, Matthew
Arnold, repeatedly pointed out that Englands middle class was the worst educated in
24Caramani (2000) dates full manhood su¤rage in Germany in 1848 but continuos parliamentary rule
only in 1871 when a united Germany was created. The crucial point, however, is that there was a jump
to full manhood su¤rage compared to Britains gradual extensions.
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Europe. In England only 1 in 1300 boys received any form of secondary education, this
compares to 1 in 249 in Prussia.
The Modernisation Hypothesis and the Arab Spring More generally, the model
describes a possible mechanism through which Lipsets famous modernisation hypothesis
might work. Lipset (1959) suggests that a high income level and a high level of education
are prerequisites of a functioning democracy25. One of the few papers proposing a
mechanism linking education and wider political participation is Glaeser et al (2007).
They argue that education raises the private benets from political participation and
thus more educated societies are more democratic. We o¤er an alternative explanation.
Education increases human capital and because human capital is not expropriatable in
the way assets are this makes agents more willing to risk moving away from the political
status quo. Societies with high levels of education are therefore very di¢ cult to control
by autocratic regimes and populist policies are less successful at averting regime change.
It is interesting to note this mechanism might well play a role in the recent Arab
uprising. The Arab countries currently undergoing transitions or challenges to the es-
tablished order are noteworthy for relatively large well-educated groups of people which
are unemployed. Over the past thirty years Arab states have seen a marked increase in
schooling rates, roughly on a par with Asia and slightly ahead of Latin America. Among
Arab states, the Maghreb and the Gulf are the two regions with the highest increase.
Comparing the countries in the Maghreb which are currently undergoing a political tran-
sition to the ones which are not, the gap in years of schooling is striking. Libya and
Tunisia have 16.5 and 14.5 while Algeria and Morocco have 12.8 and 10.5 expected years
of schooling, respectively (Kuhn, 2012).26 Importantly, many of those gaining access to
education were the rst to do so in their family and often came from modest backgrounds
25Following Barros (1999) extensive study into the determinants of democracy a large empirical lit-
erature has developed which tries to test the validity of this assumption. Barro uses lagged variables of
GDP/Capita and school attainment (average years of primary schooling) and a large number of control
variables to conclude that a higher standard of living furthers democracy. His results are thus broadly
supportive of the modernization hypothesis. Glaeser et al (2004), in a study focusing on the determinants
of growth, reach the same conclusion as Barro. They show that human capital is more important for
growth than institutions are and that in fact human capital predicts improvements in institutions but not
the other way around. In two much discussed papers Acemoglu et al (2005, 2008) argue that the results
of previous studies had been driven by omitted variable bias and that when one controls for country xed
e¤ects the causal relationship from income and education to democracy breaks down. However, a host of
later studies (Bobba and Coviello, 2007, Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008 and Castello-Climent, 2008)
o¤er evidence in favour of the e¤ect of education on democracy.
26Kuhn notes that  expected schooling of children is a synthetic cohort estimate of the years of
schooling a child would expect to complete if current grade-to-grade transition rates applied throughout
her life course.
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with very little assets in the family so that their human capital o¤ered the potential to
a signicant increase in income. This mirrors the development in 19th century Europe.
Furthermore, Chabaan observed in 2009 that one in three young Arabs, who were often
well educated, were unemployed. Clearly, the incentives of those people are such that
they have a lot to gain from a change in regime since their human capital cannot be lost
in the process but in a new system they could reap far higher returns on it than they
currently do.
Latin American Democratisation Lastly, the model also o¤ers some insights into
the latest wave of democratisations in Latin America. Remmer (1991) notes that Latin
American countries underwent both an economic crisis and a substantial political trans-
formation during the 1980s. At the beginning of the 1980s most of Latin America was
a¤ected by a debt and currency crisis which led to a collapse in growth, large capital
outows and high ination, triggered by a combination of internal mismanagement and
external shocks (see for example Diaz-Alejandro, 1984 and Krugman, 2000). This crisis
coincided with the establishment of democracy in Argentina in 1983, Bolivia in 1982,
Brazil in 1985, Chile in 1990 and Uruguay in 1985 (Mainwaring and Hagopian, 2005).
In an interesting study on the e¤ects of the 1980s crisis in Latin America Minujin (1995)
shows that overall income levels fell and the drop in income tended to be large for those in
the second and third quintile of the income distribution. This forced many middle-class
families into a category he terms "new poor". Interestingly, Minujin observes that per-
sons with six to nine years of study experienced a greater loss in income than did those
with a lower level of educationand that the fall was greatest for those with the highest
level of education. Furthermore, since ination was as high as 1,000% the savings of
many middle-class families were eroded. This created a situation in which there was a
well-educated middle class with little wealth but high potential income due to their hu-
man capital. One could conjecture that for a long time democratisation proved di¢ cult
in Latin America because the middle class held substantially more assets than the poor
and were thus more naturally aligned with the elite. The economic crisis changed the
incentives of the middle class and made them a more natural ally of the poor since they
now had more to gain from political change. The resulting pressure on the elite then led
to democratisation.
The discussion of the above examples highlight the two ways through which the
middle class can become a force for democratisation in our model. Either through
an increase in their human capital which is not accompanied by a signicant increase in
assets or through a reduction in assets brought about by an economic crisis, for example.
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Both make the middle class less averse to change and shift the balance of power away
from an autocratic status quo.
5 Conclusion
We developed a model of involuntary franchise extensions which accounts for the fact that
human capital is not expropriatable and thus intrinsically di¤erent from other sources of
income. We used this observation to create a link between the increasing human capital
levels of the middle class in 19th century Europe and the democratisation process which
was taking place at the time. The importance of the middle classes has been noted
repeatedly in earlier and inuential contributions by Lipset, Moore and others. The
middle classes do in our account not play an important role simply by the virtue of being
in between poor and rich but because economic development and the rise in education
changed their incentives more than it changed those of other groups. The insights of
the model can be used to understand cross-country di¤erences in the speed and extent
of franchise extensions in 19th century Europe but also more broadly to describe a
mechanism which links education and democratisation. As de Toqueville noted only
those who have nothing to lose ever revolt. Perhaps, it would be correct to add as a
qualier that those who have little to loose but the most to gain are the most likely to
revolt.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Setting M;2 > P;2 we nd that the poor are cheaper to
"bribe" when
(p[(1  2)yp + (2   C(2))y] + (1  p)yp)
(y +mm(1  )(yp   ym))
>
(p[(1  2)ym + (2   C(2))y] + (1  p)ym)
(y +mp(1  )(ym   yp)) : (14)
First of all, note that the derivative w.r.t.  of the LHS is always negative while that
of the RHS is always positive. A increase in  thus makes the inequality less likely
to hold. Furthermore, as  ! 1 we get (p[(1   2)yp + (2   C(2))y] + (1   p)yp) >
(p[(1   2)ym + (2   C(2))y] + (1   p)ym) which clearly never holds since ym > yp:
On the other hand, an increase in p reduces the gap between the nominators and thus
makes the inequality more likely to hold. Now, recall that the optimal tax rate of the
middle class is m and that of the poor is p > m. Finally, also note that increasing the
tax rate makes the inequality more likely to hold. Taking the limit of ! 0; and p! 1
we obtain yp(1 )+y( C())y mm(ym yp) >
ym(1 )+y( C())
y+mp(ym yp) : Now we can see that for high tax rates
the inequality always holds and for low ones it does not. There thus exists some cuto¤
value for the tax rate ( co) for which the rich appease the poor instead of the middle
class. The higher  is and the lower p is the higher will be that cuto¤ value.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows immediately from the proof of Proposition
1 by setting p = 1.
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